Does the Americans With Disabilities Act Discriminate Based on Education When Plaintiffs Suffer from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: An Examination of Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co. by Ralston, Brian C.
Volume 102 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 102, 
1997-1998 
6-1-1998 
Does the Americans With Disabilities Act Discriminate Based on 
Education When Plaintiffs Suffer from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: 
An Examination of Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and EEOC v. Joslyn 
Manufacturing Co. 
Brian C. Ralston 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Brian C. Ralston, Does the Americans With Disabilities Act Discriminate Based on Education When 
Plaintiffs Suffer from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: An Examination of Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and EEOC v. 
Joslyn Manufacturing Co., 102 DICK. L. REV. 891 (1998). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol102/iss4/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Does the Americans With Disabilities
Act Discriminate Based on Education
When Plaintiffs Suffer from Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome: An Examination of
Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and EEOC v.
Joslyn Manufacturing Co.
I. Introduction
For the past twenty years you have devoted your working life
to the local Purex plant, repeatedly screwing caps on containers of
detergent day after day. Recently, you have been experiencing a
shooting pain in your forearms and shoulders. The pain fails to
dissipate so you visit a physician who diagnoses you with carpal
tunnel syndrome. Surgery helps, but the carpal tunnel syndrome
places restrictions on your ability to perform your job responsibil-
ities. The next thing you know, your long time employer fires you
because of your inability to effectively perform your former job.
Although simplified, this hypothetical situation is happening more
and more in American companies and could arise for any employee
performing a job that involves repetitive motions.1
Carpal tunnel syndrome is a particular type of repetitive
motion injury that is believed to effect nearly two million individu-
als and cost American businesses an estimated twenty billion
dollars per year.2 Thus, the growing number of carpal tunnel
1. As early as 1959, repetitive motion conditions such as bricklayer's shoulder,
carpenter's elbow, and telegraphist's cramp were identified by Dr. Radford Tanzer. Today,
the workers most frequently reporting repetitive motion injuries are keyboard operators,
meat cutters, supermarket cashiers, assembly workers, and truck drivers. See Cathy Jackson
& H. Douglas Jones, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: A Repetitive Strain on the Workers'
Compensation System, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 765, 769 (1993).
2. See Robert L. Jones, III & R. Scott Zuerker, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Under Act
796, 32 ARK. LAW. 16 (1997). Carpal tunnel syndrome is the most common cumulative
trauma disorder and has been described as the occupational hazard of the nineties.
Moreover, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration estimates that by the year
2000, half of all workers' compensation claims will be related to cumulative trauma disorders.
See Denis Paul Juge et al., Cumulative Trauma Disorders-The Disease of the 90's: An
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syndrome cases present issues for both the employee and employer.
An employee suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome may have
been discriminated against and therefore posses a valid legal
remedy pursuant to the Americans With Disability Act (the
"ADA"). Conversely, an employer who fires an employee who can
no longer perform his employment duties solely due to carpal
tunnel syndrome may find itself defending a discrimination suit
based on the ADA. Thus, with the number of Americans suffering
from Carpal tunnel syndrome increasing, employers must become
more sensitized to the issues presented by the ADA in connection
with carpel tunnel syndrome.
The ADA was enacted for the purpose of ensuring that all
Americans would have equal access to employment opportunities.3
The ADA and its sweeping language places a large number of
individuals under its umbrella of protection. This broad language,
however, often protects individuals with impairments generally not
perceived as disabilities. Carpal tunnel syndrome is one of many
less severe impairments that poses pain and discomfort for those
who suffer from it, but is not normally associated with disabilities.
It is this comment's contention that the sweeping language of the
ADA, although meant to protect the maximum number of
Americans, often forces courts to make a decision based on a
plaintiff's educational background rather than the impairment when
dealing with less severe disabilities. This comment will examine the
inequitable results that occur from this analysis by courts.
Part II of this comment provides a medical overview of carpal
tunnel syndrome. Next, Part III explains the relevant provisions of
the Americans With Disabilities Act with respect to a claim of
discrimination. Part IV provides the factual background of two
United States District Court cases, Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and
EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co. Both cases involved plaintiffs
suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome who filed discrimination
claims pursuant to the ADA. Finally, in light of the Ouzts and
Joslyn decisions, Part V discusses the difficulties and likely results
of future discrimination claims for those who suffer from carpal
tunnel syndrome.
Interdisciplinary Analysis, 55 LA. L. REV. 895 (1995).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12113 (1994).
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II. Medical Overview of Carpal Thnnel Syndrome
Carpal tunnel syndrome is classified by the medical profession
as a cumulative trauma disorder.4 Cumulative trauma disorders
can result from force being applied over a prolonged period of time
to the same muscles. 5  Moreover, cumulative trauma disorders
involve injuries affecting the soft tissue of the hand, wrist, and arms
and sometimes result in shoulder or neck pain.6 Carpal tunnel
syndrome, a specific cumulative trauma disorder, is caused by the
local impairment of the median nerve at the wrist against the
overlying transverse carpal ligament.7 Individuals suffering from
carpal tunnel syndrome generally endure numbness and a tingling
sensation in the thumb, index, and long fingers.'
Although correction of carpal tunnel syndrome is often
difficult because of its interrelation with workplace activity,9 most
patients who undergo surgery for the disorder enjoy a nearly full
recovery."0 These patients, however, have long recovery peri-
ods,1 1 are often never able to return to work, and suffer lingering
pain. 2 Despite the persistent pain, a person suffering from carpal
tunnel syndrome generally will not be rendered unable to perform
normal daily activities. 3 Carpal tunnel syndrome, therefore, is not
an impairment traditionally considered by society to constitute a
disability because it is not completely debilitating. Despite this
perception, the overbroad language of the ADA provides sufferers
of carpal tunnel syndrome an opportunity to pursue a successful
discrimination claim.
4. See Jackson & Jones, supra note 1, at 769.
5. See Jones & Zuerker, supra note 2, at 16.
6. See Jackson & Jones, supra note 1, at 768.
7. It is believed that such impairment is associated with repetitive wrist or hand
motions that cause prolonged, elevated pressure inside the carpal tunnel, thus, diminishing
the blood flow to the nerve resulting in nerve block. See Jones & Zuerker, supra note 2, at
16.
8. See Juge et al., supra note 2, at 895.
9. See id. at 897.
10. See id. at 898.
11. Seeid.
12. See id.
13. See discussion infra notes 112-54.
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III. The Elements of a Claim of Discrimination Pursuant to the
ADA
The Americans With Disabilities Act 4 prohibits employers
from discriminating against qualified individuals in relation to job
application procedures, hiring decisions, advancement, discharge,
compensation, and training. 5 A plaintiff who seeks relief under
the ADA must establish: (1) a disability exists within the meaning
of the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job in question either with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was terminated because of the
disability. 6  A plaintiff's claim of discrimination, therefore,
depends first on the ability to prove the existence of a disability. 7
This comment will primarily focus on a carpal tunnel syndrome
sufferers burden in proving a disability, but, first, all the elements
of a claim of discrimination will be discussed seriation.
A. The First Element: Proving the Existence of a Disability
According to the ADA, an individual with a disability is: (1)
a person with a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual; (2)
a person with a record of such impairment; or (3) a person
regarded as having such an impairment.18 Thus, the Act provides
three alternatives for plaintiffs attempting to establish that they are
disabled. Establishing a physical or mental impairment has a
substantially limiting effect on a major life activity, however, is a
part of all three alternatives.19
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12113 (1994).
15. See id. § 12112(a).
16. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing White v.
York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995)).
17. See id. at 385.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1997) (Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission regulation defining disability to implement the equal employment
provisions of the ADA).
19. Although there are three ways to prove a person is disabled, all three require the
individual to have at one time or another suffered from a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. The first definition states that a physical or mental
impairment constitutes a disability if it currently has a substantially limiting effect on a major
life activity. The second definition provides that an individual who has a record of an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is disabled. Lastly, a disability can
be proven by establishing that a person is regarded as having a substantially limiting physical
or mental impairment. Therefore, if an individual cannot prove the existence of a physical
[Vol. 102:4
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To satisfy the first alternative definition of disability, two
factors must be met. First, a physical or mental impairment must
be proven, and, second, the impairment must be considered to
substantially limit a major life activity.2" The ADA does not
specifically define what constitutes a physical or mental impair-
ment." The ADA, however, provides that the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") shall promulgate regula-
tions to provide guidance in interpreting the ADA.2" The EEOC
regulations provide that a physical or mental impairment is:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.
23
The regulation emphasizes that the impairment must be either
physiological or mental.24 For example, suffering from dyslexia
would be an impairment, but just being less intelligent is not.
Likewise, suffering from asthma is an example of an impairment,
but having a scar or birthmark is not.
Proving that a physical or mental impairment exists satisfies
only the first factor of the first alternative definition of disability.
25
The second factor that must be satisfied is that the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.26 A person is considered
substantially limited if that person is unable to perform an activity
that the average person in the general population can perform or
or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, the ADA claim will fail.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
20. See id.
21. See id. § 12102(2)(A).
22. See id. § 12116 (requiring that the EEOC issue substantive regulations to implement
the ADA). Therefore, it is necessary to read the ADA in conjunction with the EEOC
regulations. See id.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
24. See id.
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Chai R. Feldblum, Americans
With Disabilities Act: Selected Employment Requirements, 217 A.L.I. 29,33 (1992) (According
to the EEOC guidelines, identifying a physical or mental impairment is only the first step in
determining if an individual is disabled.).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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is significantly restricted in the manner and duration in which that
person can perform a major life activity as compared to the average
person.27  It is generally accepted that there are certain impair-
ments, such as blindness, that are always substantially limiting for
every person.2"
With regard to less debilitating impairments like carpal tunnel
syndrome, however, the determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity will be particularized to
the individual. Therefore, because of the sweeping language of the
ADA and the EEOC regulations, individuals with the same
impairment and same symptoms may be adjudged differently with
respect to whether or not they are disabled.
An individual who has a physical or mental impairment29 may
not be able to prove that a major life activity is substantially
limited.3° The ADA, though, provides a second avenue by which
an individual can establish a disability.3 An individual is disabled,
for purposes of the ADA, if the individual has a record of a
physical or mental impairment.32
Having a record of an impairment means that a person once
suffered from a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity or was misclassified as having such an
impairment.33 This definition protects individuals who may have
suffered from impairments such as cancer, heart disease, or a
psychological illness.' Further, this second alternative definition
of a disability serves to protect persons who may have been
improperly labeled as being disabled. 35 The drafters of the ADA
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20). This broad definition does not provide much guidance as
to whether a major life activity is substantially limited. The EEOC regulations, however,
provide three factors to consider in determining if an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity. The factors to be considered are: (1) the nature and severity of the
impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent
or long term impact of the impairment. See id.
28. See P. Kathleen Lower, Americans With Disabilities Act: Regulations, Technical
Assistance Manual and Developing Case Law, 23 COLO. LAW. 807, 808 (1994) (listing other
such impairments as AIDS, deafness, and cancer).
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
32. See id.
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1997).
34. See Feldblum, supra note 25, at 38.
35. For example, the EEOC guidelines specifically point out that this definition of
disability protects individuals who may have been misclassified as being mentally retarded
or learning disabled. See id.
[Vol. 102:4
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wanted to ensure that individuals who recover from mental or
physical impairments are not discriminated against by an employer
who discovers that they were once physically or mentally im-
paired.36 These same policy concerns were also the motivating
force in the promulgation of the third alternative definition of
disability.
The third alternative definition of a disability permits an
individual who does not currently suffer from a physical or mental
impairment to possess a claim of discrimination pursuant to the
ADA if that person is regarded as having a physical or mental
impairment.37  Like the second definition of disability, this
definition is aimed at protecting against misperception in attitude
towards individuals.3" Again, the drafters of the ADA were
cognizant of the archaic attitudes that some people have toward
individuals with disabilities and wanted to avoid discrimination
based on this fact.39
Proving that a disability exists is the most critical element of
a discrimination claim pursuant to the ADA because of its
difficulty to satisfy."n Once a plaintiff has established a disability
exists, however, the remaining two elements do not present as
many factors to consider and are more straightforward in their
application.
B. The Second Element: Proving a Disabled Individual Is
Qualified to Perform the Essential Functions of a Job with or
Without Reasonable Accommodation.
Once a plaintiff has established that a disability exists
pursuant to the ADA,41 the second element of a claim of discrimi-
nation requires proof that the plaintiff is qualified to perform the
36. See id.
37. Being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment means: (1) having a
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity but is
treated by an employer as if it does; (2) having a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity only as a result of the attitudes of others; or (3) not
having a physical or mental impairment but being treated by an employer as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment. See id. § 12102(2)(C).
38. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995); see also School Bd.
of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).
39. See Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385; see also Arline, 480 U.S. at 279.
40. This is particularly true with carpal tunnel syndrome because it is not a debilitating
impairment. Part V of this comment discusses the problems a plaintiff with carpal tunnel
syndrome faces because of this fact. See discussion infra notes 112-93.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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core functions of a job with or without reasonable accommoda-
42Aquife idvda aation. A qualified individual with a disability is a person who has
the skill, experience, and education to meet the requirements of an
employment position.a3 If qualified, then the ability to perform
the essential functions of the job at issue with or without reason-
able accommodation must be established by the plaintiff.4 The
essential functions of a job are the fundamental duties of the
employment position. 5 Here, the focus is on the fundamental or
primary duties of a job position. Consequently, an employer may
refuse to hire an individual who is unable to perform a core job
function, but not an individual who fails to perform marginal
functions of the job.a6
In contemplating what functions are essential, the EEOC
regulations suggest considering why the position exists, the limited
number of employees who can perform the job function, and the
level of specialization and expertise involved in performing the
job.47 For example, an employer could require a secretary to type
one hundred words per minute because typing letters efficiently is
fundamental to being a secretary. An employer could not,
however, require a secretary to be able to repair the copier
machine because repairing the copier is a marginal or tangential job
duty.
Moreover, the second element of a claim for discrimination
pursuant to the ADA places an affirmative duty on an employer to
determine if a reasonable accommodation must be provided a.4  As
42. See Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385 (citing White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61
(10th Cir. 1995)).
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1997).
44. See id.
45. See id. § 1630.2(n)(1).
46. An example of a marginal function would be requiring a file clerk to be able to
answer the company's main telephone line. Answering the phone is a tangential duty of a
file clerk, and an employer could not deny employment to an individual with a disability on
this basis. See Feldblum, supra note 25, at 53.
47. The factors listed in the regulations are not to be considered an exclusive list.
Additional evidence that a function may be essential includes: (i) the employer's judgment
as to which functions are essential; (ii) written job descriptions prepared before advertising
or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on the job performing
the function; (iv) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;
(v) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) the work experience of past
incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) the current work experience of incumbents in similar
positions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
48. See David D. Kadue & Lawrence P. Postol, An Employer's Guide to the Americans
With Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications to Reasonable Accommodations, 24 J.
[Vol. 102:4
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stated, the second element requires a showing of the ability to
perform core job functions with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion. Therefore, if an accommodation is reasonable, it must be
supplied by an employer.49 Providing a reasonable accommoda-
tion may include modifying job procedures, modifying the work
environment so disabled individuals can perform essential functions,
or modifying policies so a disabled individual can enjoy the benefits
and privileges enjoyed by other employees.5°
Although an employer must provide reasonable accommoda-
tions for disabled individuals, the employer is relieved of the duty
if taking such action would place an undue hardship on the
employer in the operation of its business.5" Undue hardship refers
to an action requiring significant difficulty or expense. 2 In
considering whether an action results in significant difficulty or
expense, one should consider the nature and cost of the accommo-
dation, the overall financial resources of the facility, the number of
employees, and the size of the business.53
The nature of the second element of a discrimination claim
under the ADA forces employers to make case-by-case factual
determinations54 based on the factors provided by the ADA and
EEOC regulations. The employer has to determine whether an
employee can perform the essential functions of a job if a reason-
MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 711 (1991).
49. The ADA states that an employer may have discriminated against an individual by:
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee
who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial
is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable
accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the
employee or applicant.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9. Other examples of
what a reasonable accommodation may include are making existing facilities accessible to
disabled individuals, job restructuring, modifying work schedules, reassigning employees,
acquiring and modifying equipment or devices, and modifying training materials and policies.
See 42 U.S.C. 12111(9).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
52. See id. § 12111(10)(A).
53. See id. § 12111(10)(B).
54. See Kadue & Postol, supra note 48, at 710 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (1990)).
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able accommodation is provided." For large employers this
determination may prove to be relatively easy because they can
hire experts and generally have more resources to accommodate a
disabled individual. By contrast, small businesses may not possess
the resources to do an extensive study for the purpose of determin-
ing whether a reasonable accommodation must be supplied.
Although this would appear to be an undue hardship on small
businesses, the fact-specific factors provided by the ADA and
EEOC regulations do not give the employer a definite answer.
Therefore, an employer can never really know how much or how
little to spend in providing a reasonable accommodation because
the ADA does not provide specific guidelines.
Moreover, an employer will often not know whether an
employee is disabled as per the ADA, let alone whether a
reasonable accommodation should be provided. Because of the
broad and sweeping language of the ADA, employers are at a
disadvantage in determining whether a minor impairment like
carpal tunnel syndrome constitutes a disability. Thus, an employer
may unknowingly discriminate against an employee with carpal
tunnel syndrome.
C. The Third Element: Terminated Because of the Disability
The final element for a claim of discrimination pursuant to the
ADA is that the disabled individual was terminated because of a
disability.5 6 If the claim of discrimination reaches this element,
the suit is likely to be successful. Having satisfied the first element
means that an individual is disabled.57 Further, if the disabled
individual satisfies the second element, it follows that the individual
can perform the essential functions of his job with or without
reasonable accommodation.58
Because an employer may terminate a disabled employee if
providing a reasonable accommodation would result in an undue
hardship, it stands to reason that if a claim reaches the third
element that a termination was the result of a disability. Other-
wise, the claim would have failed at the second element because
either the plaintiff could not perform the essential job functions or
55. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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providing a reasonable accommodation would be too burdensome.
Thus, where a qualified individual with a disability is fired outright,
based solely on the existence of the disability as proven in the first
element, a claim for discrimination will be successful.59
As is evident from much of the above discussion, a discrimina-
tion claim hinges on proving the existence of a disability. What
impairments constitute a disability, however, is a largely subjective
determination. Moreover, the definition of disability focuses on an
impairment's effect on a person's major life activities that can result
in what appears to be contradictory outcomes for individuals
suffering from identical impairments. This phenomenon results
from the fact that people are affected differently by their impair-
ment based on their particular life experiences.
The remainder of this comment will focus on where carpal
tunnel syndrome fits into this analysis. As a less severe impairment
that is increasingly affecting more and more employees, this
analysis seems timely.6" Two recently decided United States
District Court cases, Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir,61 and EEOC v.
Joslyn Manufacturing Co.,62 serve as instructive models to illus-
trate the contrasting results of claims under the ADA because,
although factually similar, each case was decided differently.63 A
brief summary of the facts of the two cases follows below to
provide the necessary background to examine how and why
individuals with the same injury had different results in their ADA
claims.
IV. The Factual Background of Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and
EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co.
A. Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir
When individuals are first diagnosed with carpal tunnel
syndrome, their physician may place certain restrictions on their
daily activities.' For instance, they may have to wear a splint or
59. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 2.
61. No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996).
62. No. 95C4956, 1996 WL 400037 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1996).
63. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *11; Joslyn 1996 WL 400037,
at *7.
64. See generally Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610.
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cut down on the number of hours they work.65 Such was the
factual scenario of Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir66 which involved two
USAir employees with carpal tunnel syndrome.67 Ultimately, the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania determined
that neither employee was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA and entered summary judgment in favor of USAir.68
The first plaintiff in Ouzts, Betty Ouzts, reported to her
employer, USAir, that she had contracted carpal tunnel syndrome
in March 1992.69 Ouzts had been employed as a reservation sales
agent by USAir for four years.7" As a reservation sales agent,
Ouzts' responsibilities included answering phone calls, making flight
and rental car reservations, and answering questions from custom-
ers.71 In the performance of these duties, reservation sales agents
are required to type intermittently and must maintain a "nearly
constant ready, 7 2 position at their keyboard.73  In addition,
reservation sales agents are required by USAir to be available to
take calls and make reservations eighty-eight percent of the time
they are on duty.74
When Ouzts first saw a physician regarding the pain she was
experiencing in her wrists and arms, she was cleared to return to
work provided she wore a splint.75 Later, however, her carpal
tunnel syndrome progressed to the point where a splint could not
satisfactorily relieve her pain, and surgery was required.7 6 Follow-
ing her surgery, Ouzts began working half-days at the suggestion of
her physician.77 Ultimately, her physician determined that Ouzts





69. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *4.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. Although it was contested by USAir, for purposes of summary judgment, typing
was considered an essential function of a reservation sales agent. See id.
73. See id.
74. This means that a USAir reservation sales agent must be plugged into the telephone
and available to take telephone calls and make flight reservations for 88% of the time that
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one hand and involved no typing.78 USAir, however, could not
offer any available positions that met these restrictions.
79
The second plaintiff in the Ouzts case, Diane Pepke, was
involved in a similar situation."0 Pepke also had worked for
USAir as a reservation sales agent for four years prior to being
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in July 1991.81 Upon
examination by her physician, Pepke was able to continue her
regular work with the use of a wrist splint.82 Similar to Ouzts,
Pepke ultimately was forced to undergo surgery to treat her carpal
tunnel syndrome.8 3  Following her surgery, Pepke's physician
recommended a part-time schedule which USAir accommodated.'
By May 1992, Pepke's condition required that she not use her right
hand for repetitive actions and that she work half-days. 8 Despite
these restrictions, Pepke chose to continue working as a reservation
sales agent, but began inquiring about a possible transfer within
USAir. 6
As had Ouzts, Pepke officially requested a transfer to a
position that did not require repetitive motions. 7 In response to
their request, USAir informed Pepke and Ouzts that they could
either bid for ticketing positions in USAir's Reservations Services
Department 8s or continue in their part-time positions as reserva-
tion sales agents.89 Both Ouzts and Pepke rejected the offers
made by USAir and asserted that USAir did not accommodate
78. See id.
79. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *4. Ouzts never returned to
her job as a reservation sales agent. At the time her case was decided, she was working on
a part-time basis as a real estate agent. In her complaint, Ouzts alleged that she was
discriminated against under the ADA in connection with USAir's failure to find her another
position that would meet the medical restrictions placed on her because of her carpal tunnel
syndrome. See id.




84. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *6.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. On July 8, 1993, both Betty Ouzts and Diane Pepke submitted accommodation
request forms to USAir. They listed carpal tunnel syndrome as their disability and certified
that they were unable to perform a job that required repetitive motions. See id. at *9.
88. USAir contended that ticketing agents performed less typing then reservation sales
agents which was disputed by plaintiffs Pepke and Ouzts. Ultimately the court determined
the same amount or less typing was not material to its decision that plaintiffs Ouzts and
Pepke were not disabled pursuant to the ADA. See id. at *9 n.9.
89. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *9.
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their disabilities.9" Further, Ouzts and Pepke alleged that they
were discriminated against pursuant to the ADA because USAir
did not offer them positions meeting their restrictions.9' Ulti-
mately, the court determined that neither plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence that they were disabled pursuant to the ADA
so as to withstand a summary judgment motion by USAir.92
B. EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co.
In contrast to Ouzts, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois recently found a job applicant suffering
from carpal tunnel syndrome to be disabled in terms of the ADA.
In EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co.,9 the plaintiff, Aaron Cruz,
developed carpal tunnel syndrome after working eight years as a
knockout machine operator, loader, order filler, and a slicer for the
Oscar Meyer Company.94 Thereafter, Cruz underwent surgery
and subsequently returned to work without any medical restric-
tions.9"
In 1992, the Oscar Meyer plant where Cruz had been em-
ployed for eight years shut down.96 Thus, Cruz sought employ-
ment with the Joslyn Manufacturing Company.97 Cruz applied for
a punch press operator position with Joslyn and was extended an
offer of employment.98 The offer, however, was contingent on
Cruz passing a post-offer medical examination.99 Upon examina-
tion of Cruz, Joslyn's observing physician discovered that Cruz had
suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome."° The doctor determined
that Cruz's condition had improved but that he was still symptom-
atic for carpal tunnel syndrome.1"1 It was the doctor's recommen-
dation that Cruz not work in a position involving repetitive mo-
tions. 2 Based on the information supplied by its physician,
90. See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
91. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *9.
92. See id. at *18.
93. No. 95C4956, 1996 WL 400037 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1996).
94. See id. at *1. In January 1992, Cruz tested positive for carpal tunnel syndrome in
both of his wrists. See id.
95. See id. at *2.
96. See id.
97. See id.




102. See id. at *4.
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Joslyn's employment director decided to revoke its offer of
employment to Cruz."°3 The decision to withdraw the offer was
based solely on the knowledge that Cruz may have difficulty
performing the specific job of a punch press operator.' °4 Subse-
quently, Cruz filed a claim of discrimination pursuant to the ADA
alleging that Joslyn regarded him as being substantially limited in
the major life activity of working.1 5 Unlike the Ouzts' court, the
Joslyn court held that the plaintiff had withstood a summary
judgment motion by proving a disability existed pursuant to the
ADA.1
6
All three of the plaintiffs in Ouzts and Joslyn suffered from
a degree of loss to their hands and arms107 Further, plaintiff
Cruz, who was found to be disabled, was the only one who did not
feel his impairment made him incapable of performing his job. 8
Based on the factors provided by the ADA and EEOC to deter-
mine if an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity," however, the court held that Cruz was disabled."'
All three individuals could not perform the essential functions of
their job because of their carpal tunnel syndrome, but only one was
considered disabled. It is the broad language of the ADA and
inequitable treatment of persons with different educational training
that causes such an outcome for less severe impairments.
V. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and Proving a Disability
Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir and EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing
Co. highlight the fact that an employer must be very careful in its
handling of employees who demonstrate symptoms of carpal tunnel
syndrome. Moreover, employees should not assume that being
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome is dispositive of the fact
that they are disabled pursuant to the ADA. An employee trying
to prevail on a claim of discrimination pursuant to the ADA must
establish three elements to prevail: (1) the employee is disabled
103. See Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *4.
104. See id. at *4.
105. See generally id.
106. See id.
107. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *4 (W.D.
Pa. July 15, 1996); Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *3.
108. Cruz received a copy of the job description for a punch press operator and "signed
a certification that he was capable of performing the job." Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *3.
109. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
110. See Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *7.
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within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the employee is qualified to
perform the essential functions of her job with or without reason-
able accommodation; and (3) the employee was terminated because
of the disability."' The major hurdle a plaintiff faces is proving
the existence of a disability. To overcome this hurdle, all plaintiffs
must allege that an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.112 Thus, a plaintiff must choose a major life activity for
which to allege their carpal tunnel syndrome substantially limits.
Due to the nature of carpal tunnel syndrome, however, the only
major life activity that will likely be substantially affected is
working.
This issue of whether a major life activity was substantially
affected accounted for the different results in Ouzts and Joslyn.
Each court was interpreting the same statute with regard to
workers who suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and performed
repetitive motion jobs."3  The difference in outcome, however,
resulted from each individual's unique educational and training
background."4
A. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and the Major Life Activities of
Caring for Oneself Performing Manual Tasks, Walking,
Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Breathing, and Learning"5
The EEOC regulations implementing the ADA provide that
a major life activity means functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." 6 Major life activities, how-
ever, can be separated into two categories. This is because the
EEOC regulations define the major life activity of working
separately and state three additional factors courts may consider in
111. See Smith v. Kitterman, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 423, 425 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
112. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
113. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *2, *4
(W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996); Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *1.
114. See discussion infra notes 155-93.
115. This heading intentionally omits the major life activity of working. Because of its
unique definition and the three additional factors provided to determine if working is
substantially limited, the major life activity of working will be discussed separately. See
discussion infra notes 155-93.
116. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1997).
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deciding whether working is substantially limited by an impair-
ment."7
To determine whether a major life activity has been substan-
tially limited, a court should consider the nature and severity of the
impairment, the duration of the impairment, and the long term
impact of the impairment."' Both Ouzts and Joslyn indicate that
sufferers of carpal tunnel syndrome generally will not be deemed
substantially limited with regard to the first group of major life
activities.
1. The First Factor: The Nature and Severity of the Impair-
ment.-Carpal tunnel syndrome affects the soft tissue in the hands,
wrists, and arms."9 Surgery can correct carpal tunnel syndrome,
but it can not completely alleviate a patient's pain.2 ° However,
despite the fact that the pain lingers and some weakness remains,
the pain is usually not severe enough to interfere with the perfor-
mance of everyday tasks.
121
Therefore, under the first factor, courts are likely to consider
the severity of carpal tunnel syndrome minimal, as happened in
Ouzts.'22 In that case, both plaintiffs alleged that they were
substantially limited in the major life activities of caring for
themselves and performing manual tasks.'23 Ouzts testified that
although she could generally perform daily activities, she could only
drive with her left hand, could not carry heavy items, and could not
sit through a movie. 124  Diane Pepke gave a similar account of
her daily activities. 125  She testified that she could generally
perform her daily activities, but that she had to apply hot com-
presses to her shoulder to loosen it up, could not drive longer than
117. See id. § 1630.20)(3). Hereafter, to clarify which category of major life activities are
being discussed, "the first group" will refer to all activities except working.
118. See id. § 1630.20).
119. See Jackson & Jones, supra note 1, at 768.
120. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *34
(W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996). For instance, plaintiff Ouzts, whose hand was weakened to 50%
of its normal level, was not deemed to be disabled under the ADA.
121. See Jackson & Jones, supra note 1, at 768.
122. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *34.
123. Ouzts and Pepke also alleged that they were substantially limited in the major life
activity of working, but the court considered this separately in relation to the three additional
factors provided by the EEOC. See id. at *37-46. See also discussion infra notes 155-93.




twenty minutes without experiencing pain, and could not clean or
dress herself without experiencing pain.126
Based on Ouzts' and Pepke's testimony, the court found that
neither plaintiff was substantially limited in one of the first group
activities. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendant.127 For, although the carpal tunnel syndrome caused
the plaintiffs discomfort while performing daily activities, the
discomfort was not so severe that they were unable to engage in
those activities.12 It appears, that due to its lack of severity, courts
will likely find a plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome does not satisfy
the first factor. This presents a dilemma for sufferers of carpal
tunnel syndrome because, although the impairment affects their
daily routine, it is not a totally debilitating impairment and,
therefore, does not qualify as a disability.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the Social Security
Disability Practice Manual's failure to list carpal tunnel syndrome
as a disability. 129 The publication provides a listing of impair-
ments that constitute a disability based on medical data. 3°
Although the publication addresses social security law, which is not
the subject of this comment, it is certainly relevant to note that
carpal tunnel syndrome is not listed in the Manual as a disabil-
ity."' It is significant because it reinforces the point that carpal
tunnel syndrome is not an extremely severe impairment. The
publication states that "[c]arpal tunnel syndrome can produce some
unpleasant symptoms, but not enough to justify a listing.
132
Unlike this publication, the ADA does not specifically list
impairments that should be considered disabilities. 33 Instead,
Congress listed factors that are to be considered by courts and gave
courts broad discretion to determine whether someone is disabled
on a case-by-case basis. Providing a list of disabilities would have
been a better approach. By doing so, inequitable results would be
less likely to occur. An individual with a particular impairment
126. See id.
127. See id. at *11-12.
128. See id.





133. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12113 (1994).
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would be considered disabled regardless of that person's back-
ground.
Listing disabilities, however, would require a great deal of time
and money because there are hundreds of impairments that would
need to be studied in order to develop a comprehensive list.
Moreover, the list would constantly have to be amended to account
for newly discovered or developed impairments. This would
require continuous study and debate as to whether a particular
impairment is a disability. Under the current ADA structure, it is
the courts who determine what constitutes a disability. For less
severe impairments, such as carpal tunnel syndrome, this case-by-
case determination places an individual with a higher educational
background at a disadvantage. This is the unfortunate and
unintended result of enacting a sweeping statute protecting disabled
Americans from discrimination and allowing the judiciary to
interpret its language.
2. The Second Factor: The Duration of the Impairment.-The
second factor to consider in determining whether a major life
activity is substantially limited is the duration of the impair-
ment."' Based on the fact that carpal tunnel syndrome can
almost always be treated, the duration of the impairment appears
to be short.13' A full recovery, however, entails lingering pain
and stiffness of the limbs.13 6 It may be argued, therefore, that the
duration of carpal tunnel syndrome is life-long. Surgery can relieve
the symptoms, but there will always be chronic pain.'3 7 The fact
that a plaintiff undergoes surgery should not end a court's analysis
with regard to the duration of the impairment.
Thus, for a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome, the second
factor may provide an excellent argument. Plaintiffs can argue that
their carpal tunnel syndrome results in life-long symptoms. For,
although the pain is not as severe as before surgery, a limited
amount of pain does remain. 38 Accordingly, the duration of the
impairment lasts forever. The Ouzts court, however, focused on
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1997).
135. Those who undergo surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome usually recover fully within
four to six weeks. However, persons whose carpal tunnel syndrome is work related normally
do not recover for as long as twelve weeks and still experience lingering pain. See Juge et
al., supra note 2, at 898.
136. See id.
137. See Jackson & Jones, supra note 1, at 768.
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the plaintiffs could still perform first group activ-
ities.1 9 The court- held that the pain and limitations resulting
from carpal tunnel syndrome are not severe enough or lasting
enough to constitute a substantial limitation of the first group
activities.140
The Ouzts court appears to have missed the mark, however,
because the test for a substantial limitation in the ADA is a
disjunctive test. A substantial limitation occurs when one cannot
perform an activity or is significantly restricted in the performance
of that activity as compared to the average individual.141 The
language of the statute allows plaintiffs to argue that although they
can perform an activity, they are significantly restricted in the
performance of that activity.142 A plaintiff does not have to
prove both, but one or the other.143
Again, because the provisions of the ADA leave room for
judicial determination, plaintiffs could argue that not being able to
drive long distances or watch movies is a significant restriction on
daily activities. Moreover, if the average individual can perform
first group activities without pain, then experiencing pain in the
performance of those activities could be viewed as a significant
restriction. Courts should recognize that substantially limited does
not mean totally limited. The standard established by the ADA
requires plaintiffs only to show that they are significantly restricted
in their performance of major life activities as compared to the
average individual.1" Unfortunately, for the plaintiffs in Ouzts,
the court focused on the fact that they could still perform the first
group activities.
In an effort to keep the number of disabled individuals at a
manageable number, it is likely that courts will uniformly interpret
the ADA in the same fashion as the court in Ouzts. For individu-
als dealing with the pain that results from carpal tunnel syndrome,
this analysis is not comforting. But, if the ADA was interpreted to
include minor impairments such as carpal tunnel syndrome, too
many individuals would be adjudged disabled. The ADA would
139. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *32-37.
(W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996).
140. See id. at *4.
141. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
142. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1997).
143. See id.
144. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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then become more of a burden then a tool to end discrimination.
For this reason, courts will likely focus on whether a first group
activity is totally limited.
3. The Third Factor: Permanent or Long Term Impact of the
Impairment.-As with the duration of the impairment, the long
term impact of carpal tunnel syndrome, considered along with its
severity, is probably not enough to create a substantial limitation
of a major life activity. In Ouzts, Betty Ouzts had a fifty percent
loss of strength in her hand. a45 As a result, she was relegated to
performing activities involving light lifting.'46 The court, however,
disregarded her permanent loss of strength because the carpal
tunnel syndrome had not left her totally incapable of performing
the first group activities.
147
A permanent loss of strength, though, could be considered
significant. Again, the ADA does not require plaintiffs to prove
they are totally limited. It only requires them to show that they are
significantly restricted in the performance of major life activi-
ties.'48 However, carpal tunnel syndrome faces the stigma of not
being regarded as a serious impairment. For plaintiffs who deal
with its effects everyday, a permanent loss of strength is very
significant. The language of the ADA appears to aid plaintiffs who
suffer from less severe impairments such as carpal tunnel syn-
drome.149  If courts follow the reasoning of the Ouzts court, 5 '
however, plaintiffs with carpal tunnel syndrome probably will not
be considered substantially limited in a first group activity because
they are still able to perform those activities.
From this analysis, it would appear that in terms of permanent
or long term impact, as with the duration factor, carpal tunnel
syndrome could satisfy the test for disability with respect to the first
group activities. But because carpal tunnel syndrome does not
totally render individuals incapable of performing first group
activities, they will not be disabled under an Ouzts analysis.
Although individuals will have pain for life, a court may find that
145. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *6.
146. See id.
147. See id. at *5. The court seemed to dismiss the fact that each plaintiff was no longer
able to care for herself without pain and had to give up such activities as watching movies
and driving long distances. See id.
148. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
150. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *10-11.
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they are able to perform the first group activities comparable to the
average individual and, therefore, will not have proven a disability
pursuant to the ADA.
The problem with the definition of substantial limitation is that
it is based on the average individual, 5' and every individual is
different. A better standard would be to consider how an impair-
ment has affected an individual's ability to perform major life
activities as compared to the individual's previous ability to
perform. This standard would allow courts to focus on each
individual. Plaintiffs would still be required to establish that they
are either totally or significantly restricted in the performance of a
major life activity, but comparison would be made to their own
personal ability to previously perform that activity. This way, not
every plaintiff would be found disabled, but courts would be able
to focus on the impairment's effect on the particular individual.
Until the ADA is modified, however, courts will continue to
compare each plaintiff to the courts' best determination of the
average individual.
Although there are some excellent arguments that a plaintiff
with carpal tunnel syndrome can make to establish a disability with
respect to the first group activities, it appears from Ouzts and
Joslyn that courts will not find that carpal tunnel syndrome satisfies
the definition of disability with regard to those activities. Thus,
plaintiffs with carpal tunnel syndrome and other similar impair-
ments must allege that they are substantially limited in the major
life activity of working. The definition of a substantial limitation
in working and the EEOC factors accompanying this definition,
however, treat individuals differently depending on their educa-
tional and training experience. This is what accounted for the
different outcomes in Ouzts and Joslyn.52
B. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and the Major Life Activity of
Working
All three plaintiffs in the Ouzts and Joslyn cases alleged that
they were substantially limited in the major life activity of work-
151, See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
152. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *44-46; EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg.
Co., No. 95C4956, 1996 WL 400037, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1996).
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ing1 53 A plaintiff is substantially limited in working if the plain-
tiff is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs of various classes as compared to
a person of similar training, skills, and ability.'54 The inability to
perform a single job does not constitute a significant restriction
from the job market.5 ' As with the first group activities, the
nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected
duration of the impairment, and the actual or expected long term
impact of the impairment must be considered.
In determining whether the major life activity of working is
substantially limited, however, the EEOC has provided three
additional factors that courts may consider.156  These three
additional factors, along with the specific definition of working
provided by the EEOC regulations, provide for a more specific
examination of an individual's background and experiences in
conjunction with the impairment rather than just looking at the
impairment itself. As discussed earlier, when looking solely at
carpal tunnel syndrome and its effect on everyday activities, a
disability will rarely, if ever, be found. This comment further
contends that when individuals who suffer from less severe
impairments are forced to prove that their working ability is
substantially limited, inequitable results occur between persons with
the same disability and the same job.
1. The First Additional Factor: The Geographical Area
Accessible to the Plaintiff-The first additional factor to consider
with respect to working is the geographic area reasonably accessible
to the plaintiff. 57 In today's mobile and industrial society, it
would be rare for someone to be geographically denied access to
the job market. Perhaps if someone suffers from an impairment
that does not permit them to drive, it could be argued that they are
153. Ouzts and Pepke each alleged that they were substantially limited in the major life
activities of caring for themselves and working. Cruz, however, only alleged the major life
activity of working was substantially limited. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11610, at *36-37; Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *6-7.
154. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(3)(i) (1997).
155. See Smith v. Kitterman, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 423,426 (W.D. Mo. 1995); see also Leslie
v. St. Vincent New Hope, 916 F. Supp. 879, 884 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
156. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). Although the regulation states that these three
additional factors do not have to be considered, courts will generally consider them in their
analysis. See Lamury v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1225-PFK, 1995 WL 643835 (D. Kan. Oct. 5,
1995).
157. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A).
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geographically challenged. However, even someone who cannot
drive is not totally precluded because of the various types of mass
transportation.
It is possible, though, that an individual could live in an area
that only offers one type of work. For instance, an individual could
live in a coal town, isolated from industrialization. In that case, the
person would likely be geographically limited. Also, the ADA and
EEOC regulations do not indicate what distance should be
considered as too far for a plaintiff to travel to work.15 This
determination is left to the courts. Some people are accustomed to
traveling long distances, whereas others would consider a twenty-
mile bus ride to work a substantial distance. But this is not the
standard established by the ADA. The standard speaks to
geographical accessibility being limited. This factor likely will not
be pivotal unless an individual is totally isolated from society.
Even though a person may not be able to drive, there is generally
some form of public transportation available.
Neither the Ouzts court nor the Joslyn court discussed the
factor of a job being limited due to geography.159 The reason for
this was that all three plaintiffs apparently had no trouble gaining
geographical access to the jobs they sought.1" Carpal tunnel
syndrome does not normally limit an individual's mobility, and, as
a result, the first additional factor will likely not be a part of a
court's analysis. It is the second two additional factors that become
more important in the determination of whether working is
substantially limited.
2. The Second Additional Factor: The Availability of Similarly
Skilled Employment.-The second additional factor examines the
availability of other jobs which utilize similar skills involved in the
job that the impaired individual was performing prior to injury.
161
According to the Joslyn court, the inability of an individual to
perform a class of jobs is good evidence of a disability.162  In
158. See id.
159. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610 (W.D. Pa.
July 26, 1996); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., No. 95C4956, 1996 WL 400037 (N.D. Ill. July 15,
1996).
160. See Ouzts & Pepke, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *4; Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037,
at *3.
161. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B).
162. See id.; see also Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994). Bolton
held that a plaintiff must establish disqualification from a broad range of jobs as compared
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Joslyn the court determined that when a plaintiff's impairment
foreclosed a broad range of jobs in an industry, the plaintiff was
disabled.'63 The employee in Joslyn, Aaron Cruz, was deemed
incapable of performing repetitive motions by Joslyn's doctors due
to his carpal tunnel syndrome.)" By limiting Cruz' access to
repetitive motion jobs like the ones he had held before, Cruz was
excluded from at least seven types of jobs at Joslyn Manufactur-
ing. 65 But this was not enough for the court to determine that
Cruz was disabled.'66 Ultimately, it was the fact that Cruz was
foreclosed from a broad range of jobs in an industry that made him
disabled.'67
Similarly, the plaintiffs in Ouzts, Betty Ouzts and Diane Pepke,
suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome that resulted in pain
significant enough to request job transfers.168  USAir did offer
them a transfer, but the transfer was to another job that involved
repetitive motions.169  Therefore, Ouzts and Pepke would have
encountered the same restrictions placed on them by their then
current jobs. USAir's action was not an overt one like Joslyn's in
revoking Cruz' offer for employment, but it had the same effect.
The action limited Ouzts' and Pepke's opportunity to perform jobs
not limited by their impairment. 7 °
The Ouzts and Joslyn courts' analysis does not provide any
guidance as to what constitutes a class of jobs. A class of jobs
could be jobs with similar salaries or jobs that require similar
training. Thus, courts are left with little guidance in determining
what constitutes a class of jobs. The analysis could be either
narrow or broad. For example, a court could consider a class of
jobs to constitute jobs offered by the same employer. Another
court could consider a class of jobs to be all jobs with a $30,000
to the average individual of comparable educational and vocational background. Merely
showing that a plaintiff is incapable of performing the particular job the plaintiff is
disqualified from does not establish a disability pursuant to the ADA. See id.
163. See Joslyn, 1996 WL 400037, at *8.
164. See id. Joslyn's physician determined after examining Cruz that he should perform
no repetitive motions with either hand. The doctor based this decision on both medical data
and her own knowledge of a punch press operator's job duties. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at *7.
167. See id.
168. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610, at *2, *4
(W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996).
169. See id. at *2.
170. See id. at *8.
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salary. Courts have no concrete standard to determine whether a
plaintiff is limited in a class of jobs.
The best way to determine what constitutes a class of jobs
would be by comparing the skills used in performing each job. For
example, if there are fifty jobs which involve repetitive motions,
those fifty jobs would constitute a class of jobs. Further, if a
plaintiff could not perform repetitive motions, then that plaintiff
would be considered foreclosed from the repetitive motion class of
jobs. As it stands now, courts look at the entire job market and
whether an individual has access. The problem with this analysis
is that it permits factors such as education and training to affect the
outcome rather than focusing on the impairment and how it affects
the job from which the plaintiff was terminated.
According to Ouzts and Joslyn, rather than trying to classify
each job, courts will rely on the third additional factor to determine
ultimately whether an employee is limited in the major life activity
of working with respect to carpal tunnel syndrome."' A plaintiff
may be limited in the type of similarly skilled employment they can
acquire, but that does not mean they will be limited in access to a
broad range of jobs. The requirement of showing limited access to
a broad range of jobs places a much higher burden on plaintiffs.
But, perhaps because the class of job standard is too difficult to
determine, courts focus more on the third additional factor of
whether access to a broad range of jobs is limited.
3. The Third Additional Factor: Substantially Limited in
Access to a Broad Range of Jobs.-As stated above, an employee
may be limited in the performance of a single type of job by an
impairment but, based on other factors, not limited to a broad
range of jobs. According to the ADA and EEOC regulations, this
is not sufficient to prove a substantial limitation of working.17 It
is this factor which accounts for the difference in Ouzts and Joslyn.
In Joslyn, the court considered the fact that Cruz held no higher
than a high school degree and had a background in semi-skilled
work.173 Based on these factors, Cruz was deemed limited in his
171. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.(j)(3)(ii)(c) (1997).
172. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
173. See EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., No. 95C4956, 1996 WL 400037, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July
16, 1996).
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access to employment in general.'74 Cruz was unable to accept
employment requiring a college degree or professional training
which was considered by the court to limit his access to the job
market.'75
In Ouzts, neither plaintiff offered direct evidence regarding
their educational and professional training background.176 The
court did, however, consider the fact that, at the time of the suit,
Ouzts was working in real estate and must, therefore, have had
some professional training.177 If either Ouzts or Pepke had
introduced any direct evidence tending to show a lack of education
or training, the court likely would have considered them disabled.
The standard arising from Ouzts and Joslyn is that to be
disabled plaintiffs must have their access to the job market totally
limited. The three factors provided by the EEOC, however, do not
establish such a strict standard. 78 Plaintiffs should be able to
show that their access to either a class of jobs or broad range of
jobs is substantially limited.179 Moreover, the standard estab-
lished by Ouzts and Joslyn places a heavy burden on a plaintiff.
Most people are able to perform more than one job, but individuals
may prefer a certain type of job. The factors provided by the
ADA, however, do not take this into account.
By focusing on the education and training of an individual, a
court undergoes a very particular analysis. At first glance, this
appears to be beneficial; however, focusing on education and
training can lead to very inequitable results. For example, suppose
persons C and B both have carpal tunnel syndrome and work in a
factory on the assembly line. Because each of them suffers from
carpal tunnel syndrome, they cannot perform their job duties.
Without providing a reasonable accommodation, their employer
174. Although Cruz did not offer any evidence on the issue of education, the court found
him to have been excluded from a broad range of jobs. From the proceedings, the court was
able to deduce that Cruz had no higher than a high school education, had little or no
vocational training, and had worked in factory type jobs his entire life. Based on these facts,
he was found disabled because he was excluded from a broad range of jobs. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Ouzts & Pepke v. USAir, No. 94-625, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610 (W.D. Pa.
July 26, 1996). The burden is placed on the plaintiff to establish a lack of access to a broad
range of jobs. See id.
177. See id. at *11.
178. Plaintiffs may prove that they are either limited in access to a class of jobs or a




fires them because of their impairments. Also, the only activity
that is significantly affected is their ability to perform work
involving repetitive motions. C is a high school graduate and has
taken some night classes on computers and electronics. B,
however, did not complete high school and has no specific job
training. Under this factual scenario, B would be considered
disabled because of a lack of education and training. A court
would likely consider C to be able to find another job because of
the existence of a high school degree. Each employee was treated
exactly the same by the employer, but, because of C's higher
educational level, the result is different. Thus, individuals like C
are punished because of their education.
One reason courts may focus on the third additional factor is
because it will result in less plaintiffs being found disabled.
Because many individuals will likely possess more than one type of
vocational skill or will be reasonably educated, when courts focus
on the third additional factor, such individuals will not be fore-
closed from a broad range of jobs. But the factors do not take into
consideration that individuals like C may have chosen to work on
an assembly line for a reason. Perhaps C has a small child and a
spouse who works during the day. Assembly line work could be
the only night job available. In order to take care of the small
child, C may have specifically chosen this type of work. For C,
being able to prove that access to a class of jobs is foreclosed would
be important because of C's desire and need to work at night.
In addition, plaintiffs such as C in the example above might
have worked at their job for a long period of time. This could
render even a well educated individual incapable of finding other
employment. The education and skills that had once helped the
individual find various types of employment may have become less
desirable in the marketplace. In today's rapidly changing world, a
high school graduate of ten years ago will be far behind a high
school graduate of the year 2000.
Moreover, the conduct of the employer should also be
considered. An employer should have to treat employees perform-
ing the same job consistently regardless of educational background.
But, according to the ADA and the Ouzts and Joslyn courts'
analysis, an employer can treat differently employees performing
the same job who suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome. If an
employer knows an employee is a college graduate, that employee
is less likely to be found disabled pursuant to the ADA. This is
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particularly true of a disability such as carpal tunnel syndrome that
normally affects only work activity. In such a case, the employee
will have to claim a substantial limitation of working because the
other major life activities are not substantially limited.18° If the
employee is also a college graduate, the number and types of jobs
available will be significantly larger than if the employee is a high
school dropout. Whether or not it was the intention of Congress,
it appears that based on the reasoning of Ouzts and Joslyn, a
plaintiff's educational and training background will likely determine
whether access to the job market is limited for someone who
suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome.
It appears that the Ouzts and Joslyn courts were following the
same reasoning advanced by other courts. In McKay v. Toyota
Motor Corp.,"' a twenty-four year old college graduate was
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome.'82 Her carpal tunnel
syndrome disqualified her from the class of jobs in which she was
currently employed. 83 The court reasoned that she was not
disabled, though, because, based on her educational background,
she was not disqualified from employment in general.1" Again,
the court was concerned with a total limit on access to the job
market.'85
By contrast, in Smith v. Kitterman, Inc.,l86 the District Court
for the Western District of Missouri held that a plaintiff suffering
from carpal tunnel syndrome might be disabled.18 7 The court
reasoned that because the plaintiff had never completed high
school, had no vocational training, and had worked at the same
repetitive motion type jobs for twenty-two years that she was
limited in access to a broad range of jobs.188 Further, in Leslie v.
St. Vincent New Hope,"' it was held that the plaintiff was dis-
abled based on the fact that she had never completed tenth
grade. 90 There, the plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome rendered
180. See supra notes 115-53 and accompanying text.
181. 878 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
182. See id. at 1014.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1015.
185. See id.
186. 897 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
187. See id. at 427.
188. See id.
189. 916 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
190. See id. at 883.
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her disabled because of her lack of education and training.191
Thus, it appears the courts will continually focus on a plaintiff's
education and professional training in determining if a disability
exists with regard to carpal tunnel syndrome.
It is difficult for a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome, based
solely on the impairment, to show a total limit to the job market
because carpal tunnel syndrome normally affects only repetitive
motion jobs. Therefore, a plaintiff's claim will likely be determined
by the educational background of the plaintiff. As an Act designed
to end discrimination against persons with disabilities, it would
appear that the ADA should focus more on the impairment rather
than on the educational background of the plaintiff. It could be
that carpal tunnel syndrome is not severe enough to ever constitute
a disability on its own. This determination would be more
equitable than determining case-by-case who is disabled based on
that person's education and job training. It could be argued,
however, that the ADA's approach at least allows plaintiffs with
less severe impairments, like carpal tunnel syndrome, to allege that
they are disabled.
By allowing courts to make the ultimate determination, the
ADA does allow a sufferer of any impairment to allege discrimina-
tion regardless of the severity of the impairment. This approach,
however, takes the focus of the impairment and places it on the
background of the individual. Further, it places a burden on the
courts to determine how medical impairments affect every
particular individual based on the factors provided by the ADA
and EEOC. As a result, courts will likely continue to engage in an
individualized analysis based on education and training when the
plaintiff suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome.
VI. Conclusion
The purpose of this comment was to analyze what an employ-
ee with carpal tunnel syndrome must allege in order to be success-
ful in a claim of discrimination pursuant to the ADA. From an
analysis of Ouzts and Joslyn, it appears that the test for discrimi-
nation will be general with respect to the nature of the impairment
but highly individualized with respect to its effect on the individual.
Because of the medical realities of carpal tunnel syndrome, the
impairment likely will not limit a major life activity other than
191. See id.
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working. Therefore, plaintiffs will have to allege that their ability
to work is substantially limited.
The courts appear to look broadly at the job market rather
than narrowly. Accordingly, plaintiffs must show that their access
to the total job market is limited. For a plaintiff with a high degree
of education, this will be difficult. As a result, plaintiffs with less
education and skills have a better opportunity to prove they are
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. It
appears that the ADA, which is a statute designed to eliminate
discrimination, treats plaintiffs inequitably based on their education
and training. This analysis is relevant only to less severe impair-
ments like carpal tunnel syndrome because such impairments
require an individual to prove working is substantially limited.
However, for highly educated individuals, this will be very difficult
because of the likelihood that they will not be foreclosed from a
broad range of jobs. Therefore, the plaintiff most likely to receive
full compensation in a claim under the ADA is one who has no
education or job training.
Brian C. Ralston
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